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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case N|o. 880062-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OEf CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal tfrom an order 
suppressing evidence in a case charging defendant with a second 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdictiort to hear this appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-26(c)(5) (19$2) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the validity of the initial stop of defendant 
irrelevant where defendant consented to th£ subsequent search of 
his truck? 
2. Was the stop of defendant by a highway patrolman 
with 21 years of experience for following Another vehicle too 
closely on Interstate 15 merely a pretext JEor an investigative 
search? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized, 
Utah Constitution, art. I § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 15, 1987 Highway Patrol Trooper Paul 
Mangelson was driving southbound on Interstate 15 at about 4:00 
p.m. when he observed defendant's truck driving northbound near 
Nephi (R. 50). Mangelson may have observed that defendant's 
truck displayed out of state license plates (R. 50). He did 
observe that defendant was following the vehicle in front of him 
at a distance of about 3 or 4, possibly 5 carlengths and he felt 
that distance was unsafe (R. 51). 
Mangelson turned through the median and pulled up to 
defendant's truck (R. 51, 52). Pulling alongside defendant, 
Mangelson estimated defendant's speed at approximately 50 miles 
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per hour (R. 5 1 )A At that time, Mangelson also observed that 
defendant appeared to be Hispanic (R. 52). Because Mangelson 
still felt defendant was following too closejLy, he pulled 
defendant over (R. 53) • 
Mangelson issued a citation to defendant for following 
too closely and for driving on an expired driver's license (R. 
5)* At some point, defendant consented to Mfrngelson's subsequent 
search of the truck (R. 53).2 Mangelson disbovered approximately 
one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel. He 
arrested defendant for possession of a controlled substance (R. 
6). 
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over 
to District Court on the narcotics charge (1^ . 1-3) . Defendant 
moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence claiming that 
Mangelson's traffic stop was pretextual for an investigative 
search of defendant's truck (R. 12-13). Juc^ ge Harding granted 
the motion to suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and an Order suppressing the evidence on January 6, 1988 
(R. 49-55). 
* Judge Harding found that Mangelson estimated the speed at 50 
miles per hour even though Mangelson testified that it was 50 to 
55 and defendant said he was travelling 54 failes per hour (T. 
169, 192, 195). 
2 Defendant conceded that he consented to the search, therefore, 
no details were presented after the facts surrounding the initial 
stop. Defendant challenged only the initial stop (R. 53, T. 
189) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court found that defendant consented to the 
search of his vehicle and yet it suppressed the evidence 
discovered in that search finding that the search was pretextual* 
The decision to suppress the evidence was erroneous because 
defendant's consent vitiated any prior illegality of the stop 
where defendant essentially conceded that the consent was 
voluntary and did not result from the alleged illegality of the 
initial stop. 
Alternatively, the stop was lawful because the officer 
observed a traffic violation for which he ticketed defendant. 
Therefore, the stop was not a mere pretext for an investigative 
search. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VALIDITY OF THE STOP WAS IRRELEVANT WHERE 
DEPENDANT CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS 
TRUCK. 
Defendant argued below, and the trial court held, that 
Trooper Mangelson's stop of defendant for "following too close" 
was merely a pretext for an investigative search. The lower 
court found also that defendant consented to the search (F.F. 
#18) .^  Indeed, when the State attempted to present evidence 
concerning the issue of consent, defendant objected claiming that 
he challenged only the validity of the stop (T. 189). 
Essentially, defendant conceded that the search was consensual 
but claims that his consent was irrelevant where he alleged 
3 "F.F." refers to the Findings of Fact, attached as Appendix A. 
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pretext for the initial stop. Because this was a consent search, 
the lower court improperly suppressed the evidence. 
In State v. Valdez, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, (Utah Dec. 28, 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that it need not consider the 
validity of a search warrant where there was valid consent to 
search the premises. Similarly, in this case, this Court need 
not consider the validity of the initial stop where defendant 
consented to the search of his truck. 
The cases defendant relied upon below to argue 
otherwise do not, in fact, support his position. In both State 
v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) and State )v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1986), the searches challenged were inventory searches of 
impounded vehicles, the validity of which hanged upon the 
validity of the impoundment, not upon the validity of the initial 
stops. In both cases, the searches were found to be pretextual 
because the officers did not follow established police procedures 
when impounding the vehicles and the impoundments were not 
justified. In neither case did the State attempt to justify the 
search based upon consent of the defendant. 
Quite dissimilarly, in this case, the validity of the 
search did not rest upon the actions of the officer or any 
observations made by him because of the sto$> but rested solely 
upon defendant's voluntary consent to the search of his vehicle. 
Defendant chose to waive his fourth amendment and Article I § 14 
rights even though he could have refused to allow the search. 
Had defendant refused the search, there is no evidence a search 
would have occurred since there was no probable cause established 
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for the search and there was no claim that defendant 's truck 
would have been impounded for the minor t r a f f i c v io la t ions 
i n i t i a l l y c i t e d . 
Nor does State v. Mendoza, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 
Dec. lr 1987) support defendant's claim that an invalid stop 
invalidates a consent search. The search of Mendoza's vehicle 
was made after he was arrested by INS officers for being an 
illegal alien. Mendoza did not consent to the search. 
In fact, the State is unable to locate any cases where 
a pretext claim was allowed to successfully invalidate a 
subsequent consent search. The pretext cases have been limited 
to searches based upon a defective impound or a claimed search 
incident to arrest or plain view discovery all of which depend 
for their validity upon the validity of the initial intrusion 
upon the defendant's constitutional rights. See generally W. 
LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (2d ed. 1987). In these 
types of cases, the officer predicates the search upon an arrest 
for a minor offense where he would normally have only issued a 
citation at the scene. 
Consent searches do not depend for their validity upon 
the legality of prior police conduct so long as the consent is 
voluntarily given. Moran v. Burbine, U.S. , , 106 S. 
Ct. 1135, 1141-42 (1986) ("The state of mind of the police is 
irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness 
of [defendant's] election to abandon his rights."). The focus in 
a consent search case is the defendant's grant of consent and not 
the request to search or the reasons underlying it. "rVIoluntarv 
-6-
consent, as defined for Fourth Amendment purposes, is an 
intervening act free of police exploitation i>f the primary 
illegality and is sufficiently distinguishable from the primary 
illegality to purge the evidence of the primary taint." United 
States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141f 1147-48 (lOfch Cir- 1986) cettt 
denied 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986). Se& also United States v. Fallon, 
457 F.2d 15, 20 (10th Cir. 1972) (while evidence would not have 
been obtained had defendant not been stopped, "but for" factual 
connection not sufficient to render evidence inadmissible); 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(defendant's voluntary consent removes any t^int of prior illegal 
seizure of defendant). 
The lower court's finding that the allegedly pretextual 
stop invalidated defendant's consent flies in the face of the 
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Wongi Sun v. United 
States* 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Wong Sun state|d: 
We need not hold that all evidence is 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" simdly because 
it would not have come to light bi^ t for the 
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the 
more apt question in such a case ^s "whether, 
granting establishment of the priniary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality orj instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint." 
Id. at 487-88 (citation omitted). 
The Tenth Circuit held in Carson that "'exploitation of 
the primary illegaility' means that the police use the fruits of 
the primary illegality to coerce defendant into granting his 
consent." 793 F.2d at 1148 (emphasis in original). Even if the 
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police request to search is unreasonabler it is irrelevant to the 
grant of consent unless consent is involuntarily given, I&. at 
1148-49. 
In this case, defendant conceded that he consented to 
the search and never challenged the voluntariness of his consent. 
Indeed, he argued that his consent was irrelevant and convinced 
the judge to exclude evidence of his consent. Effectively, then, 
he conceded that his consent was voluntary and the court found 
that defendant consented to the search.^ Because defendant 
consented to the search, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's suppression of the evidence and need not consider the 
validity of the stop. 
POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE INITIAL STOP WAS FOR A 
VALID TRAFFIC OFFENSE AND WAS NOT A MERE 
PRETEXT FOR AH INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH. 
Even if this Court were to find that defendant's 
consent did not vitiate any prior illegality, it can still find 
that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence. The stop 
here was predicated on an observed traffic offense and was not 
pretextual regardless of the officer's state of mind. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-62 (1953) makes it illegal for a driver to follow 
more closely than is reasonable and prudent, with regard to the 
conditions of the road and the traffic driving on it. Officer 
Mangelson testified that when he saw the defendant, his truck was 
* Notably, defendant prepared the Findings, Conclusions and Order 
entered by the court that contain this finding (R. 49-55), see 
Appendix A. 
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no more than three to five carlengths behind the car ahead of 
him, at approximately 50 to 55 miles per houiU 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 27-10-4 (19$3) , the highway 
patrol has the responsibility to enforce the laws and rules of 
the road and regulate traffic. Contrary to the defendant's 
assertion that the stop was a pretext designed only to allow a 
search, the patrolman issued a citation to defendant, finding him 
in violation of the law's injunction against following too 
closely. 
Officer Mangelson determined that defendant violated 
the law by observing his vehicle and pulling alongside to 
determine his approximate speed. Because th£ officer observed 
the defendant's driving and found he was following too closely, 
the stop was not a pretext for a search but an attempt to 
regulate traffic and enforce the laws of Utah. Even if the 
officer entertained an improper motive for t^ ie stop, that alone 
does not invalidate the stop so long as it w|as also based upon 
the observation of a traffic violation; i.e., that it was an 
objectively reasonable stop without reference to the officer's 
subjective state of mind. United States v. Robinson, 444 U.S. 
218 (1973); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d| 704 (11th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1976). 
Defendant argued below that the stop was not 
objectively reasonable because defendant is Hispanic and Officer 
Mangelson admitted that he would ask to search vehicles driven by 
Hispanics for contraband about 80% of the t^me and because 
defendant claimed that he was not following too closely. First, 
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it should be noted that Mangelson also said that he would like to 
search vehicles driven by Caucasians in 80% of his traffic stops 
(T. 13). Second, while defendant claims that he was not 
following too closely, his own testimony refuted that claim. 
Defendant said he was travelling 54 miles per hour (T. 43, 46). 
He also estimated that he was 85 to 95 feet behind the vehicle in 
front of him (R. 52). The rule of thumb for a safe following 
distance is one carlength or 20 feet for every 10 miles per hour 
of speed (T. 27). If defendant was 95 feet behind the nearest 
vehicle, he was following at less than five carlengths behind 
that vehicle. Thus, even if defendant was travelling at 50 miles 
per hour, he was following too closely. 
It is also important that Mangelson did not determine 
that defendant is Hispanic until after he turned across the 
median and after he had decided to take enforcement action (T. 
26-27, 31, 37, R. 51-52). While the court found that Mangelson 
stopped defendant on a pretext because he was "Latin" and had out 
of state license plates, the court also found only that Mangelson 
"may have" seen that the license was out of state prior to 
turning around to apprehend defendant for the following too close 
violation (R. 50), and the court found that Mangelson observed 
defendant's ethnic appearance only after he had pulled alongside 
defendant to estimate defendant's speed (R. 51-52). Thus, even 
though the court found that Mangelson wanted to stop Hispanics 
and search their vehicles, the facts in this case do not support 
the conclusion that Mangelson trumped up the traffic violation 
merely as a pretext to an investigative search. 
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Given that the conclusions reached by the lower court 
were not a reasonable view of the facts that the court found and 
were thus clearly erroneous, this Court should remand the case to 
the lower court for entry of conclusions consistent with the 
facts. .£££ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1987) (applying Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) tio a criminal case). 
Furthermore, even if Mangelson did entertain the 
thought that he would like to search defendartt's truck in the 
moments between his observation that defendant was Hispanic and 
the actual stop, those thoughts are not relevant to a 
determination that the stop was valid, Robinson. 414 U.S. at 218. 
Thus, the lower court's use of this information to invalidate an 
otherwise lawful traffic stop was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to reverse the decision of the lower court suppressing the 
evidence either because the search was consensual or because the 
facts do not support the conclusion that the search was 
pretextual. 
DATED this ^ 1 day of /*'''A&*~- 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and exact copies 
of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to Walter F. 
Bugden, Jr., 8 East 300 South #426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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APPENDIX A 
- 1 3 -
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 ^ ^k ^ m ^ m xso^n ^ ^ cuuntu 
F 111:: D " 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
jfi?: C : : ; J 
IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo rafP.Greenwoc.C^1 0 ^ 7 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
v. : 
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO, : 
Defendant. : Case }fo. 81-D 
ooOoo < 
On December 7, 1987, the Defendant1$ Motion to Suppress 
came on before this Court for an Evidentiary Hearing. The 
--~te was represented by its attorney, Dohald J. Eyre, Jr., 
the Defendant was present in person, £nd represented by 
his counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr. Highway Patrol Trooper 
Paul Mangelson and the Defendant Jose Francisco Arroyo both 
testified at this hearing. After giving tareful consideration 
to the testimony presented at the hearing^ the demeanor of the 
witnesses on the witness stand, reviewing memoranda and case 
law submitted to the Court by both counsel, and listening to 
oral argument, this Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 15, 1987, at approximately 4:00 p.m. 
the Defendant, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was the driver of an 
older model Ford Pick-up with a camper. The vehicle was 
headed in the northbound direction on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah. 
2. On the same date, and at the same time, Highway 
Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving in a southbound 
direction on 1-15 when he observed the truck driven by the 
Defendant proceeding in a northbound direction. 
3. The Defendant testified he was driving in a group or 
cluster of three cars, his vehicle being the third vehicle in 
the group. Trooper Mangelson testified that he only saw two 
vehicles in the northbound direction and that the Defendant's 
vehicle was the rear vehicle. y 
4. Trooper Mangelson observed that the Defendant's 
vehicle had out of state (California) license plates. 
5. In July of 1987, Trooper Mangelson attended a 
seminar which focused upon the types of individuals who 
transport controlled substances and the types of vehicles that 
said controlled substances are transported in. 
6. Trooper Mangelson testified that by in large the 
Utah Highway Patrol had found that most drug trafficing was 
done by Colombians, Cubans, and Hispanics. 
7. Trooper Mangelson also testified that one of the 
topics discussed at the seminar was the necessity for having a 
reason to stop an automobile driven by a Colombian, Cuban, or 
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an Hispanic. Trooper Mangelson understood that he could not 
stop a vehicle just because the driver was of Latin origin. 
8. As a result Trooper Mangelson's training at this 
seminar, he admitted that whenever he observed an Hispanic 
individual driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the vehicle. 
The Trooper also admitted that once he stepped an Hispanic 
driver, 80% of the time he requested permission to search the 
vehicle. 
9. Trooper ,Mapgej.gon estimated the Defendant's speed 
was 50 miles per hour. As the Trooper's vehicle passed the 
Defendant's vehicle heading in opposite directions, the 
Trooper testified that he believed the Defendant's vehicle was 
three to four, maybe five cars lengths behind the vehicle 
immediately in front of it. Based on the Trooper's estimate 
of the Defendant's speed, the Trooper testified that he 
concluded that the Defendant was "Following too Close" to the 
vehicle immediately in front of it. 
10. The Trooper then executed a U-turn through the 
median and caught up with the Defendant's vehicle within a 
half mile to a mile from the location of the initial 
observation of the Defendant's vehicle. 
11. Upon overtaking the Defendant's vehicle the Trooper 
testified that rather than pulling the Defendant over 
immediately, he instead pulled up along side the Defendant's 
vehicle in order to observe the occupants of je^e J)^endantf s 
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12. Trooper Mangelson testified that the Defendants 
vehicle was still three to four, maybe five cars lengths 
behind the vehicle directly in front of it, and that this 
distance was unsafe, and therefore the Defendant was 
"Following too Close" in violation of the applicable traffic 
code. 
13. When the Trooper pulled along side the Defendant's 
vehicle, the Trooper did observe that the two occupants of the 
Defendant's vehicle were of Latin origin. 
14. Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it 
was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an 
individual for "Following too Close" to record the license 
plate of the front car. However, the Trooper's denial on this 
point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the 
Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. The 
Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate 
number of the front car in this case. 
15. The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 to 
95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in 
front of his own. The Court finds this testimony to be 
credible. 
16. In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper 
Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was 
"Following too Close" or that any other attested facts 
preponderated to the level necessary to permit a 
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constitutional stop of the Defendant's vehicle. Moreover, the 
Court finds that the Trooper's own testimony established the 
probability that no violation of law occurred, and that the 
alleged violation was only a pretext asserted by the Trooper 
to justify his stop of a vehicle with out of state license 
plates and with occupants of Latin origin. 
17. The Trooper stopped the Defendant's vehicle for 
allegedly "Following too Close". Upon stopping the 
Defendant's vehicle, he asked for and received identification 
from the Defendant. However, upon receiving this 
identification, and learning from the Defendant that he had 
only recently acquired the automobile, the Trooper did not run 
a NCIC check on either the driver or the Defendant's vehicle 
(to verify if the vehicle was stolen). The Trooper denied 
that running a NCIC check was standard police procedure. 
18. The Trooper requested permission to search the 
Defendant's vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the search 
of the vehicle. 
19. After searching the camper portion of the truck, 
Trooper Mangelson detected that a package of some sort was 
inside of the passengers's door. After gaining access to the 
inside panel of the passengers's door, Trooper Mangelson 
removed three bundles containing approximately one kilogram of 
a white powder wrapped in duct tape. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact of the Court now 
enters the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A stop of an automobile can only be made upon 
reasonable and articulable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1986) or upon probable cause, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983). 
2. Trooper Mangel son lacked any reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to stop the Defendant in the case at bar. Instead, 
the stop of the Defendant by Trooper Mangelson for allegedly 
"Following too Close" was only a pretext utilized by the 
Trooper to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state 
license plates and with occupants of Latin origin. Pretext 
stops are unconstitutional. State v. Mendoza, Slip opinion no. 
20922 (Utah Dec. 1, 1987). 
3. The pretextural stop was employed by the Trooper to 
conceal his genuine investigative purpose. Because the stop 
of the Defendant in the case at bar was unsupported by either 
articulable suspicion or probable cause, the Defendant was 
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
4. All evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's 
unlawful detention must be suppressed. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court now enters its: 
ORDER 
The stop that lead to the consensual search and seizure 
was a pretext stop and an unconstitutional violation of the 
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Defendant's right to be free from unreasonlable searches 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment of thel United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. All evidence procured as a result of the 
unlawful stop of the Defendant is therefore suppressed. 
DATED this C/jtouiay of f ^^^^^ , 198g
 t 
Approved as trb form: app fo f( 
DONALD J. EYKE,/0R7T 
Juab County Attorney 
I 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
W A L T E R F. BUGDEN. J R . — LARRY R. KELLER 
A. HOWARD LUNDGREN 
257 TOWERS. SUITE 340 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH —10 
SALT LAKK CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 532-7282 
December 16, 1988 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: State of Utah v. Jose Francisco Arroyo 
Case No. 880062-CA 
Attention: Julie Whitfield, Case Manager 
Dear Julie: ^ ^ L ^Q^^ 
Pursuant to Utah Court of Appeals Rule 24(j), please be 
advised that in addition to the cases which the Appellant has 
cited in his brief, he intends to rely upon S^ at:o~~iFFJ58fltt, 94 Utah 
Adv.RepJ(-3d (filed November 1, 1988) at oral argument in the 
above-entitled matter. This supplemental citation pertains to 
pages 4 through 9 of the Appellant's brief, and further supports 
the arguments made therein. 
Thank you for your attention. 
Yours truly, 
WFB/edp 
cc: Sandra L. Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
